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How to prevent cheating in Pinch's scheme
H. Ghodosi, J. Pieprzyk, G.R. Chaudhry and J. Seberry
Indexing term: Security of data

A modified protocol is proposed which prevents cheating in the
Online multiple secret sharing scheme proposed by Pinch.

Introduction: The goal of a secret sharing scheme is to distribute a
secret among a group of participants in such a way that the secret
can be reconstructed by designated subsets of participants. An
important issue in a secret sharing scheme is that the reconstruction procedure must provide the valid secret to all participants
from an authorised set. That is, a dishonest participant must not
be able to fool the others so that they obtain an invalid secret
while the deceiver is able to get the valid secret. This problem has
been discussed by several authors (see, for example, [1 - 3]).
Cachin [4] proposed a computationally secure scheme for online
secret sharing with general access structures, where all the shares
are as short as the secret. The scheme provides the ability to share
multiple secrets and allows us to add participants dynamically,
without having to redistribute new shares. These abilities are realised by storing additional authentic information at a publicly
accessible location.
Pinch [5] points out that Cachin's scheme does not allow shares
to be reused after the secret has been reconstructed without a further distributed computation protocol such as that of Goldreich et
al. [6]. Pinch presents a modified protocol for computationally
secure online secret sharing,. based on the intractability of the
Diffie-Hellman problem, where shares can be reused.
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In this Letter, we show that Pinch's scheme is vulnerable to
cheating. We then modify it to prevent cheating.

cheating but does not detect the cheat(s) and also cannot prevent
cheating. That is, the cheater(s) obtain the secret while the others
gain nothing.

s

Pinch scheme: M is a cyclic group of order q (written multiplicatively) in which the Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable (that is,
given elements g, gx and gY in M, it is computationally infeasible to
obtain gXY) and! M ~ G is a one-way function. The group operations in G and M are addition and multiplication modulo a large
primep.
The set P of participants is denoted by P" ... , Pn" Certain subsets X E 2P are authorised to recover the secret K. The family of
minimal authorised sets of participants is denoted by r (an
authorised set XI is minimal if XI !;;; X 2 , and ~ E r implies that XI
= X 2).
Pinch's protocol works as follows : The dealer D, who knows
the secret K, randomly chooses shares Si (integers prime to q) for
each participant Pi E P and transmits Si over a secure channel to
Pi' For each minimal authorised set X E r, IXI = t, the dealer randomly chooses gx to be a generator of M and computes

Tx = K _ f(giLEX BX)
and posts the pair (gx, Tx) on the notice board. To recover the
secret K, a minimal authorised set X = {Pb ... , PJ of participants
comes together and performs the folloWing steps:
(i) member PI reads gx from the notice board, forms g;1 and
passes the result to P 2 ;
(ii) each subsequent member Pi' for 1 < i < t, receives g j .B,-l
and raises this value to the power si to form g Si which is
passed to Pi+ I;
(iii) the fmal participant P t receives gj ...s,l and raises this
value to the power St to form

t,

Bx
... 8, -_ 911
xEX
VX -- g81
X
x
(iv) on behalf of the access set X, member Pt reads Tx from
the notice board and reconstructs K as K = Tx + f (Vx).
If there are multiple secrets K, to share, then it is possible to use
the same one-way function f, provided that each entry on the
notice board has a fresh value of gx attached.
Pinch also has a variant proposal which, according to him,
avoids the necessity for the fIrst participant PI to reveal g;1 at step
(i). PI takes r modulo q at random and forms g ~I and passes the
result to P2 , and so on. At the end of protocol, Pt returns the computed value r "sl to PI which computes

gi

Vx = (g';t, ... 8'f

-1

(mod p)

where ,I is the inverse of r, that is r x ,I = I mod q (the other
parts of the protocol are the same as the original protocol).

How to cheat: Pinch's scheme has a major disadvantage in that it
is vulnerable to cheating. In this scheme, a dishonest participant Pi
E X may contribute his fake share s'i = asi , where a is a random
integer modulo q. Since every participant ~f an authorised set X
(IXI = t) has access to the fmal result g;;",si't, the participant Pi
can calculate the value

-- g81
x ... 8, ... 8, -_ 9x11 xEX

Bx

-- Vx

How to prevent cheating: tet C = 1:xex g;x correspond to an
authorised set X. We assume that in the initialisation phase of the
Pinch scheme the dealer also publishes Cx = gxc . Note that this
extra public information gives no useful information about the
secret or about participants' shares. Otherwise, we could solve the
discrete logarithm in M and easily solve the Diffie-Hellman problem.
Let X be an authorised set of participants. At the reconstruction
phase, every participant Pi E X computes g;i and broadcasts it to
all participants in the set X. Thus, every participant Pi E X
receives t - I values g;j corresponding to all Pj E X, Pj Pi' Each
participant computes C and verifIes Cx 1:0 gxc. If the verifIcation
fails, then the protocol stops. Let participants agree to perform
computation in the cycle P" ... , Pt. If the check Cx 1:0 gxC is successful, then each participant Pi (i = 1, .... , t) knows the true value
Gi-I of its predecessor (Pt is the predecessor of PI)' So participant
Pi (i = 1, ... , t) initiates the protocol by computing (gi-I)'i and
passing it to P,+I' The protocol proceeds as in the Pinch scheme
and ends at Pi-2 • In this way, the participant Pi-I cannot directly
contribute to the computation which started by Pi'
Let there exist only one cheat, Pi (1 ::; i ::; t) in the system. If Pi
cheats, the computation initiated by Pi+! must be correct (the correctness can be verifIed as gx Vx 1:0 g;;, where V x is the result
obtained by P,cl)' That is, although cheating has occurred, the
honest set of participants can recover the secret.
If there exists a group of collaborating cheats, then in the above
protocol each participant must play (simultaneously) the role of PI
for every other tl participants in the set X. Although the number
of computations increases rapidly, before completing the protocol
any possible cheating will be detected and the protocol will be
stopped. At stage j (1 < j < t), for every set of j (out of t) participants (without loss of generality, for PI' ... , P) there will be j! dif·ferent computations of gj ...Sj. Hence, inequality of these values
indicates cheating in the system. Moreover, assuming the majority
of participants are honest (this is a reasonable assumption for any
robust secret sharing scheme) the minority of participants who
obtain values different from the common value in stage j, are the
cheats.

"*

Remark: A group of m cheats can cheat the system at the fIrst
stage, that is, they can contribute with fake shares such that the
resulting C is equal to the original one. However, the above protocol detects their cheating in next stages (there are at least 2m + 1
stages for such a set of collaborating participants).
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in the original Pinch scheme and let V~ be the fmal result. Every
participant x E X, can verify whether

4

5
6

If the verifIcation fails, then cheating has occurred in the protocol
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Remark: Cachin's scheme is secure against this form of cheating,
because in his scheme participants have no access to Vx = 1:xe xSx •
Thus, if a participant contributes a fake share, he cannot modify
the result to obtain the valid secret (the function f is assumed to
be one-way).
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